Plaintiffs "Played Spanish Music at Home"; Neighbors "Complained to the Police"; Tort Litigation Ensued
No success for the plaintiffs, at least at this stage.
No success for the plaintiffs, at least at this stage.
"If I disagreed or offered another opinion, I was told I had cognitive dissonance," Josh Diemert says.
Threats of suicide and of disclosing an ex's sexual orientation may count as threats for harassment purposes (for the non-polyamorous as much as for the polyamorous, of course).
but the Michigan Court of Appeals reverses.
“Students ... remain free to express offensive and other unpopular viewpoints [at least outside school], but that does not include a license to disseminate severely harassing invective targeted at particular classmates in a manner that is readily and foreseeably transmissible to those students.”
Trial court: "I understand that you have a first amendment privilege, but sometimes the first amendment privilege contravenes certain statutes that are enacted by the State ...." Appellate court: That's "a misunderstanding of the relationship between statutes and constitutions."
So holds the Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court, rejecting a First Amendment defense.
Gov. Gavin Newsom signed a bill in September that will chip away at a policy that has long been criticized as enabling racially-motivated policing.
The return of the trollish forum demonstrates the futility of bans on bad speech.
How, if at all, should we try to be nice in an inherently not-nice occupation?
My argument: "Petitioner Jane Doe—a frequent unsuccessful litigant—is asking this Court to impose unconstitutional prior restraint to prevent a law professor from writing about important, publicly available cases about pseudonymity."
Cloudflare's decision brings up fundamental questions about how internet infrastructure companies should operate.
Clearly hostile, but was it threatening?
The Eighth Circuit tries to rein in the criminalization of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.
“Defendants cannot claim a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption to regulate C.G.’s off-campus speech by simply invoking the words ‘harass’ and ‘hate’ when C.G.’s speech does not constitute harassment and its hateful nature is not regulable in this context.”
Plus a nice catalog of how high the bar can be for punishable threats under New York law.
likely unconstitutional, holds a federal district court.
The complaining student alleged the students' remarks were "harassing and threatening" him because of his conservative "political affiliation" and his "religious beliefs."
When a judge hearing a protection order petition thinks the defendant is engaged in "harassment," which can include two or more statements the judge thinks is libelous, the judge can effectively criminalize future libels of the plaintiff by the defendant.
The plaintiff alleged that the Wardlaw-Hartridge School had failed to comply with its own procedural rules in the Student-Parent Handbook.
The court concludes that the federal "cyberstalking" statute covers only speech intended to "put the victim in fear of death or bodily injury" or to "distress the victim by threatening, intimidating, or the like."
Under the reasoning of the Georgetown University Office of Institutional Diversity, Equity & Affirmative Action (IDEAA) report in the Ilya Shapiro matter, a wide range of public speech criticizing religions, political parties, veterans, etc. could be "prohibit[ed] harassment."
The trial court reasoned: "You guys ... have a spat on Facebook.... Nobody cares about these s[p]ats. Just block them and move on."
when the lawyers are investigating allegations that the employee "had romantic or sexual feelings for one of the students she coached."
So holds the Eighth Circuit, even though a state trial court had indeed enjoined the Christian Action League's mailings under that law.
No, says the Appeals Court of Massachusetts: "We take this opportunity to reiterate that, where a c. 258E order is sought on the basis of speech alone, the plaintiff must prove that the speech rose to the level of true threats or fighting words and not merely that it was 'harassing, intimidating, or abusive in the colloquial sense.'"
Now the critic's First Amendment lawsuit over this (and other matters) can go forward.
What counts as "bullying and harassing" behavior, you might ask? The bill doesn't say.
"[N]early every public official draws the attention of critics and cranks who have opinions they insist on sharing.... But rather than accept that as one of the privileges of public service, the defendants decided to pursue a lawsuit that asked a state court to impose a prior restraint on the plaintiff's speech."
That's the law in Delaware, it turns out.
From leading liberal constitutional law professor Andrew Koppelman (Northwestern), in the Chronicle of Higher Education.